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Multiscalar Governance and Climate Change: 









I. INTRODUCTION: AGREEMENTS AMONG SUBNATIONAL 
GOVERNMENTS AT COPENHAGEN 
As leaders of nation-states struggled to save the Copenhagen 
negotiations from total failure with the Copenhagen Accord,1 the 
 
†Associate Professor, Washington and Lee University School of Law; B.A., 
J.D., Yale University. I am grateful for being included in the thoughtful dialogue at 
the Maryland Journal of International Law’s symposium on Multilateralism and 
Global Law: Evolving Conceptions of International Law and Governance and for 
the Journal’s thoughtful editing. This Paper was greatly enhanced by the discussion 
at the symposium. I also would like to thank Brian Murchison for his insightful 
suggestions, which significantly improved the piece. As always, I tremendously 
appreciate the love, support, and patience of Josh, Oz, and Scarlet Gitelson. 
1. See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, Fifteenth Sess., Dec. 7–18, 2009, Copenhagen, Den., Draft 
Decision -/CP 15: Proposal by the President, Copenhagen Accord, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2009/L.7 (Dec. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Copenhagen Accord], available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf. See also Arthur Max, 
Obama Brokers a Climate Deal, Doesn’t Satisfy All, DAILY RECORD (Morristown, 
N.J.), Dec. 19, 2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 25562965; Andrew C. Revkin 
& John M. Broder, A Grudging Accord in Climate Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 
2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/20/science/earth/20acc 
ord.html; Michael Gerrard, The Heat Is On, MARTEN LAW GROUP, Dec. 14, 2009, 
http://copenhagenreport.com/articles/the-heat-is-on [hereinafter Gerrard, The Heat 
Is On]; Michael Gerrard, From Copenhagen, an Eye on the U.S. Senate, MARTEN 
LAW GROUP, Dec. 15, 2009, http://copenhagenreport.com/articles/20091215-eye-
on-senate [hereinafter Gerrard, From Copenhagen, an Eye on the U.S. Senate]; 
Michael Gerrard, A Small Number of Huge Issues Are All That Remain, MARTEN 
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leaders of many major states, provinces, and cities also meeting there 
found agreement much easier to achieve. Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger of California, United States; Premier Jean Charest of 
Quebec, Canada; Governor Emmanuel Eweta Uduaghan of Delta 
State, Nigeria; Environmental Minister Cherif Rahmani of Algeria; 
and President Jean Paul Huchon of Region Ile-de-France, France held 
a joint press conference on December 14, 2009 to announce that the 
Club of 20 Regions (R20) would launch in September 2010.2 This 
coalition extends the Global Climate Solutions Declaration signed at 
the Governors’ Climate Summit that Governor Schwarzenneger 
hosted in October 2009.3 Specifically, these governmental leaders 
plan to ―[d]evelop a shared vision for global security and prosperity,‖ 
―[p]ursue adaptation strategies to address current and future climate 
change,‖ ―[m]itigate greenhouse gas emissions,‖ ―[s]upport public-
private partnerships and the use of finance mechanisms to address 
global warming,‖ and ―[p]romote technology transfer and capacity 
building agreements.‖4 Developed and developing country 
subnational leaders agreed upon these goals, which have much in 
common with the nation-states’ voluntary commitments under the 
Copenhagen Accord, without the need for interventions like that of 
President Obama in the final hours of the meetings among nation-
states.5  
Mayors from around the world also achieved agreement at their 
Climate Summit for Mayors during the Copenhagen conference. 
More than fifty mayors from multiple nation-states, as well as some 
governors, signed the Copenhagen Climate Communiqué, which 
urged national action and highlighted the key role that cities play in 
 
LAW GROUP, Dec. 16, 2009, http://copenhagenreport.com/articles/20091216-huge-
issues-remain [hereinafter Gerrard, A Small Number of Huge Issues Are All That 
Remain]; Michael Gerrard, Crunch Time, MARTEN LAW GROUP, Dec. 17, 2009, 
http://copenhagenreport.com/articles/20091217-crunch-time [Gerrard, Crunch 
Time]; Michael Gerrard, Michael Gerrard’s Copenhagen Report: Sunday, 
December 20, MARTEN LAW GROUP, Dec. 20, 2009, http://copenhagenreport.com/ 
node/158 [hereinafter Gerrard, Michael Gerrard’s Copenhagen Report]. 
2. Press Release, Office of the Governor of California, Gov. Schwarzenegger 
Announces New Coalition of Subnational Leaders to Combat Climate Change 
(Dec. 14, 2009), http://gov.ca.gov/press-release/14032/ [hereinafter Press Release]. 
3. Governors’ Climate Summit, Los Angeles, Cal., Oct. 2, 2009, Global Climate 
Solutions Declaration (Oct. 2, 2009), available at http://www.wisgov.state.wi.us/d 
ocview.asp?docid=15325. 
4. Press Release, supra note 2. 
5. See Max, supra note 1; Revkin & Broder, supra note 1; Gerrard, Michael 
Gerrard’s Copenhagen Report, supra note 1. 
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addressing climate change and the leadership that they have shown.6 
Cities and other local governments from fifty-nine countries 
registered 3,232 climate targets in the Copenhagen City Climate 
Catalogue, which is a global effort connected with the Copenhagen 
meetings to compile targets and achievements by localities on climate 
change.7 
Although none of these agreements includes states, provinces, and 
localities that wish to move as slowly as or more slowly than national 
governments on greenhouse gas emissions, these leader smaller-scale 
governments make decisions which impact significant quantities of 
emissions. The Communiqué indicates that the signatory cities 
represent more than half the world’s population and that urban areas 
produce up to seventy-five percent of global greenhouse gas 
emissions.8 Governor Schwarznegger’s press release notes more 
broadly that the ―UN Development Program estimates that up to 80 
percent of the pollution-cutting policies that will meet a new 
international commitment will happen at the subnational level, 
making this partnership critically important to meeting post-Kyoto 
commitments.‖9 Moreover, as of February 2010, 1,017 U.S. mayors 
have agreed to meet or exceed Kyoto Protocol10 targets, and the 877 
European cities that have signed the Covenant of Mayors have 
committed to targets that go beyond the European Union’s 2020 
goals.11  
 
6. The Copenhagen Climate Summit for Mayors, Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 14–
17, 2009, Cities Act: Copenhagen Climate Communiqué (Dec. 16, 2009) 
[hereinafter Communiqué], available at http://www.kk.dk/Nyheder/2009/Decemb 
er/~/media/B5A397DC695C409983462723E31C995E.ashx. 
7. The City Climate Catalogue, The City Climate Catalogue, Copenhagen City 
Climate Catalogue—List of Commitments, http://www.climate-catalogue.org/index 
.php?id=6870 (last visited Mar. 21, 2010). 
8. Communiqué, supra note 6. 
9. Press Release, supra note 2. 
10. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto 
Protocol]. 
11. The United States Conference of Mayors, Mayors Climate Protections 
Center – Mayors Leading the Way on Climate Protection, http://www.usmayors.or 
g/climateprotection/revised/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2010); European Commission 
Energy, Covenant of Mayors, http://www.eumayors.eu/mm/staging/library/CoM_te 
xt_layouted/Texte_Convention_EN.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2010). For additional 
examples of transnational efforts among subnational governments, see Local 
Government Climate Roadmap, Climate Roadmap—About the Roadmap, 
http://www.iclei.org/index.php?id=9639 (last visited Mar. 21, 2010); ICLEI Global, 
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This Paper asks how these agreements among subnational 
governments, which occurred in a parallel but formally separate 
fashion from the Copenhagen Accord, should fit into assessments of 
the way forward from the Copenhagen conference. It draws from my 
previous law and geography work to argue that different approaches 
to international legal theory, with their varying views on nation-
states, shape the possible narratives of these subnational efforts and 
of the extent to which they should be integrated into the formal treaty 
processes on climate change. The Paper’s scope is quite narrow to 
allow thoughtful treatment of this conceptual issue. It does not try to 
provide a comprehensive treatment of the Copenhagen negotiations, 
U.S. federal policy, subnational efforts to address climate change, or 
the mechanics of subnational integration. Rather, it focuses on 
different theoretical approaches’ narratives of the parallel and 
separate efforts as a way in which to focus on the foundational 
questions of global governance that are the topic of this Volume. It 
argues that an exploration of these partially conflicting theoretical 
perspectives assists in efforts to move forward towards more 
effective transnational climate governance.  
The Paper begins in Part II by sketching the context in which these 
subnational developments take place. In so doing, the Part examines 
the state of international treaty negotiations and also the example of 
regulatory efforts within one of the world’s most important emitters, 
the United States. Part III then considers the legal status of these 
efforts as a matter of domestic and international law, with an 
emphasis on the gap between their formal and informal significance 
at an international level. It examines how different theoretical 
approaches to conceptualizing international lawmaking might narrate 
the current legal significance and potential future role of these 
subnational efforts. Part IV then draws from these narratives to 
examine where opportunities lie for greater integration of these 
efforts with those by nation-states at an international level. The Paper 
concludes by reflecting on the broader significance of this example 
for conceptualizing multilateralism and global law. 
II. SUBNATIONAL COPENHAGEN AGREEMENTS IN CONTEXT 
The agreements among subnational entities at Copenhagen, in 
 
ICLEI Climate Program, http://www.iclei.org/index.php?id=800 (last visited Mar. 
21, 2010). 
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recognition of the core international legal role of nation-states, 
included calls for national governments to reach agreement and to 
acknowledge the importance of smaller-scale governments in climate 
change regulation. The Copenhagen Climate Communiqué, for 
example, was framed as a message from cities to nation-states. The 
Communiqué opened by stating:  
We, the mayors and governors of the world’s leading cities, 
have joined together in Copenhagen in December 2009, at the 
Copenhagen Climate Summit for Mayors to send a strong and 
united message to national governments: seal the deal in 
Copenhagen and acknowledge internationally the pivotal role 
of cities in fighting climate change.12 
After detailing the local climate strategies and the need for 
national recognition of and support for them, the Communiqué 
closed: ―We are prepared to collaborate, innovate and try even 
harder. Our message to national governments is simple: agree on 
ambitious targets and start reducing now—and be confident that if 
cities are engaged, empowered and given the right resources we will 
deliver on our commitments.‖13  
Despite this clear message from smaller-scale governments, the 
focus in negotiations among nation-states at Copenhagen largely 
centered on whether they could agree with one another enough to 
move ahead. With the United States at last constructively reengaged 
in the international treaty process on climate change, hopes were high 
that meaningful progress could be achieved at the Copenhagen 
negotiations in December 2009. However, negotiations did not go as 
smoothly as hoped, and a last minute intervention by President 
Obama helped save the meeting from failure but resulted only in 
nations making progress on a few specific issues and taking note of 
the Copenhagen Accord—which primarily laid out next steps, 
including nations making more specific commitments pursuant to the 
Accord by January 31, 2010.14  
 
12. Communiqué, supra note 6. 
13. Id. 
14. See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 1, paras. 4–5; Max, supra note 1; 
Revkin & Broder, supra note 1; Gerrard, Michael Gerrard’s Copenhagen Report, 
supra note 1; Guarav Singh, China, India, Brazil Commit to Meet Copenhagen 
Accord Deadline, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 25, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ne 
ws?pid=20601090&sid=alXpNdEdnAV4; India, China Won’t Sign Copenhagen 
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Although much drama transpired in the intervening month, the key 
nation-state players all made their January 31, 2010 submissions 
under the Accord. However, the commitments generally take the 
form of countries promising to take significant steps only if other 
countries do so, and the United States additionally tied its pledge to 
whether climate change legislation passes.15 As a recent World 
Resources Institute report explains, the good news is that the Annex I 
parties’ (the major developed countries) commitments represent 
substantial progress beyond previous commitments, but the bad news 
is that they fall well short of the reductions that the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) says are needed 
to stabilize global concentrations of carbon dioxide at levels which 
would minimize the most serious risks of climate change.16  
For the purposes of considering the relationship between the 
national and subnational efforts at Copenhagen, however, the Accord 
and the submissions under it reinforce the separateness of these 
subnational calls for action from formal international lawmaking. The 
Accord, which is an agreement among nation-states, does not 
reference subnational efforts.17 Similarly, the submissions by nation-
states pursuant to the Accord are brief statements of national 
emissions goals. For example, the United States’ submission uses a 
base year of 2005 to set an emissions reduction target ―[i]n the range 
of 17%, in conformity with anticipated U.S. energy and climate 
legislation, recognizing that the final target will be reported to the 
Secretariat in light of enacted legislation.‖18 This exclusion of the 
subnational efforts is certainly legally appropriate since the formal 
structure of the treaty negotiations, as discussed in more depth in Part 
III, treats nation-states as the primary subjects and objects of 
 
Accord, HINDU, Jan, 23, 2010, at 1, available at http://beta.thehindu.com/news/nati 
onal/article93870.ece?homepage=true. 
15. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Information 
Provided by Parties to the Convention Relating to the Accord, 
http://unfccc.int/home/items/5262.php (last visited Mar. 21, 2010). 
16. See Kelly Levin & Rob Bradley, Comparability of Annex I Emission 
Reduction Pledges 21 (World Res. Inst., Working Paper, 2010), available at 
http://pdf.wri.org/working_papers/comparability_of_annex1_emission_reduction_p
ledges_2010-02-01.pdf. 
17. See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 1. 
18. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.S. 
Submission in Accordance with Copenhagen Accord, Jan. 28, 2010, available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/application/pdf/unitedstatescphaccord_app.1.pdf 
(citation omitted). 
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international law.19 However, it gives little sense of how these 
significant efforts by states, provinces, and cities might fit into 
international efforts by nation-states to address climate change. 
A look within the United States, one of the critical nation-states in 
these international negotiations, presents further perspective on the 
crucial role that subnational governments are playing beyond these 
international meetings in pushing national agendas forward and in 
making individual policy decisions, both of which have formal 
international legal relevance only when their nation-state acts. The 
United States has long struggled to achieve comprehensive national 
action on climate change, especially through its legislative branch. 
While it has a host of general federal environmental statutes, which 
are increasingly being applied to the problem of climate change,20 and 
has taken a few specific legislative steps on climate change,21 
comprehensive statutory efforts to address climate change have 
repeatedly failed over the years.22 The U.S. Senate also passed a 
 
19. See infra Part III. 
20. In the context of motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions, see, for example, 
Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy Standards (Apr. 1, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 
600 and 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 537, 538) [hereinafter Final Rule], available at 
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/regulations/ldv-ghg-final-rule.pdf, which brings 
together regulatory processes under the Clean Air Act of 1963, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–
7671q (2006), and the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 32901–
32916 (2006). 
21. See, e.g., Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, 15 U.S.C. § 2901 (2006); 
National Climate Program Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2901–07 (2006). 
22. The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th 
Cong. (2009), has passed the House, but an analogue passing the Senate appears 
unlikely. The Lieberman–Warner Climate Security Act of 2008, S. 3036, 110th 
Cong. (2008), which was a substitute amendment to America’s Climate Security 
Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. (2007) and America’s Climate Security Act of 
2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. (2007), both made it out of committee but never 
reached a vote. Many other bills died in committee. See, e.g., Climate Stewardship 
Act of 2003, S. 139, 108th Cong. (2003); Climate Stewardship Act of 2004, H.R. 
4067, 108th Cong. (2004); Climate Stewardship Act of 2005, H.R. 759, 109th 
Cong. (2005); Climate Stewardship Act of 2005, S. 342, 109th Cong. (2005); 
Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2005, S. 1151, 109th Cong. (2005); 
New Apollo Energy Act of 2005, H.R. 2828, 109th Cong. (2005); Keep America 
Competitive Global Warming Policy Act of 2006, H.R. 5049, 109th Cong. (2006); 
Clean Air Planning Act of 2006, S. 2724, 109th Cong. (2006); Safe Climate Act of 
2006, H.R. 5642, 109th Cong. (2006); Global Warming Reduction Act of 2006, S. 
4039, 109th Cong. (2006); Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2007, S. 
280, 110th Cong. (2007); Global Warning Pollution Reduction Act, S. 309, 110th 
Cong. (2007); Electric Utility Cap and Trade Act of 2007, S. 317, 110th Cong. 
(2007); Climate Stewardship Act of 2007, H.R. 620, 110th Cong. (2007); Global 
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resolution during the initial Kyoto Protocol negotiations under 
President Clinton which made it clear that ratification would be 
impossible, even before President Bush explicitly announced that he 
would not continue any efforts towards ratification.23 Although the 
Obama Administration has made significant progress through 
regulation under existing statutes and financial incentives under the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA),24 
broader legislative progress remains slow in the United States.25  
In that domestic context, some states and localities have been 
major drivers of federal regulation and have shown leadership in their 
own efforts, while others have pushed in the other direction. For 
example, the Obama Administration’s new National Plan to regulate 
motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions emerged in part from 
California, together with a group of other states, pushing for a waiver 
under the Clean Air Act26 to allow those subnational entities to 
exceed national standards.27 Moreover, states advocated on both sides 
 
Warming Reduction Act of 2007, S. 485, 110th Cong. (2007); Safe Climate Act of 
2007, H.R. 1590, 110th Cong. (2007); Clean Air Planning Act of 2007, S. 1177, 
110th Cong. (2007); Low Carbon Economy Act of 2007, S. 1766, 110th Cong. 
(2007); Climate Stewardship and Economic Security Act of 2007, H.R. 4226, 110th 
Cong. (2007); Climate MATTERS Act of 2008, H.R. 6316, 110th Cong. (2008); 
Carbon Leakage Prevention Act, H.R. 7146, 110th Cong. (2008). 
23. S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997); George Bush’s Global Warming Speech: 
The US President Unveils his Clear Skies and Global Climate Change Initiatives at 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Silver Spring, Maryland, 
GUARDIAN, Feb. 14, 2002, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2002/feb/14/us 
news.globalwarming. 
24. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (codified in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.). 
25. For an in depth discussion of these issues, see Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal 
Federalism and Climate Change: Implications for the Obama Administration (Feb. 
3, 2010) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Maryland Journal of 
International Law).  
26. Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 42 U.S.C.). 
27. See Final Rule, supra note 20; The White House, Presidential 
Memorandum—EPA Waiver—State of California Request for Waiver Under 
42 U.S.C. 7543(b), the Clean Air Act, Jan. 26, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/th 
e_press_office/Presidential_Memorandum_EPA_Waiver/; Press Release, United 
States Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Grants California GHG Waiver 
(June 30, 2009), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/bd4379a92c 
eceeac8525735900400c27/5e448236de5fb369852575e500568e1b!OpenDocument; 
Remarks at the Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., Remarks on National Fuel 
Efficiency Standards, Daily Comp. Pres. Doc., 2009 DCPD No. 00377 (May 19, 
2009), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD-200900377.pd 
f; Letter from Stephen L. Johnson, Adm’r U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Arnold 
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in the U.S. Supreme Court case Massachusetts v. EPA,28 which has 
thus far resulted in an endangerment finding by the Obama 
Administration’s Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and joint 
rulemaking by the EPA and Department of Transportation after many 
months of inaction by the Bush Administration’s EPA.29 The Obama 
Administration has also established a public–private leadership 
partnership that includes states and localities on energy efficiency 
issues.30 In addition to all of these interactions, as discussed in depth 
in the scholarly literature and in statements by policymakers, a wide 
range of localities and states are using the land use planning and 
environmental regulatory authority to decrease their emissions from 
energy production and consumption and from transportation.31 
U.S. localities and states are thus simultaneously joining domestic 
and international partnerships, participating in a complex national 
regulatory process, and making their own smaller scale regulatory 
decisions. None of these actions has formal international legal 
significance. In fact, that lack of formal significance likely makes 
agreement easier to achieve. The cities, states, and provinces are 
committing to actions within their authority. They are bound to 
follow these agreements through their normative commitments and 
the public pressure which accompanies them rather than by any 
accompanying international legal mechanism. But formally relevant 
or not, this panoply of subnational efforts raises issues about the 
regulatory role that these smaller-scale entities play in overall 
transnational efforts to address climate change. Specifically, this state 
of affairs provides the basis for the theoretical inquiry of Part III: 
namely, how should these efforts figure, if at all, into a narrative of 
 
Schwarzenegger, Governor of Cal. (Dec. 19, 2007), available at http://ag.ca.gov/c 
ms_attachments/press/pdfs/n1514_epa-letter.pdf; Petition for Review of Decision 
of the United States Environmental Protection Agency, State of California v. 
United States Environmental Protection Agency, No. 08-70011 (9th Cir. Jan. 2, 
2008), available at http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/press/pdfs/n1514_epapetition 
-1.pdf. 
28. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
29. See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases 
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66494 (to be codified at 
40 C.F.R. pt. 1); Final Rule, supra note 20; John M. Broder, Greenhouse Gases 
Imperil Health, EPA Announces, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2009, at A18, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/08/science/earth/08epa.html. 
30. See United States Environmental Protection Agency, Leadership Group, 
http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-programs/napee/leadership.html (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2010). 
31. See infra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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international lawmaking on climate change? 
III. THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF TRANSNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
AMONG SUBNATIONAL ENTITIES: COMPETING THEORETICAL 
NARRATIVES 
In a formal sense, these agreements among states and cities have 
no international legal relevance. Their capacity to act is grounded 
largely in state and local governmental authority, and their 
agreements lack the binding character of treaties or customary 
international law among nation-states. Mayors and governors could 
participate in the formal negotiations of the Conference of the Parties 
(COP) only as members of national delegations, and none of the 
agreements among them figured directly into the Copenhagen 
Accord. Because nation-states are the primary subjects and objects of 
international law, these very productive meetings were merely 
sideshows to the main event of treaty negotiations. Moreover, this 
basic structure is unlikely to change. While scholars can envision 
more inclusive governance models, cities, states, and provinces will 
not realistically be given seats at the table during the next meeting of 
the COP, and making such a scheme work would be daunting as a 
practical matter.32   
Yet ending the story here seems incomplete. These coalitions of 
subnational governments, even if they include only the cities, states, 
and provinces that want more stringent regulation—and not the many 
others which do not—represent a great deal of emissions. Their 
members also will have to deal with significant adaptation challenges 
in the coming years. Especially in the current international 
environment, in which the Copenhagen meeting reinforced that 
simply having a more responsive United States participating will not 
solve climate governance challenges, these subnational efforts 
represent important steps forward which have practical import.  
Scholars have tried to capture this intuition through a variety of 
approaches. Recent publications, including some of my own, have 
 
32. Gavin Newsom discussed these issues in response to a question I posed to 
him at a conference following his keynote address. Gavin Newsom, Mayor of San 
Francisco, Remarks following his Keynote Address at the University of California 
Hastings College of the Law Conference: Surviving Climate Change: Adaptation 
and Innovation (Apr. 4, 2008) (notes on file with author). For an exposition of 
nation-states as the core legal actors under international law, see IAN BROWNLIE, 
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 287–88 (6th ed. 2003). 
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used variations on network theory, transnational legal process, 
international relations theory, and legal pluralism to describe these 
transnational coalitions.33 Others have detailed planning efforts by 
cities and discussed their contribution in more traditional subnational 
terms.34 Still others, generally focused largely on U.S. domestic 
policy, have included these local efforts as part of broader 
cooperative federalism models.35 Not all of the literature views these 
subnational efforts as valuable; numerous scholars have raised 
 
33. My work on these issues includes Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change 
“International”?: Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 585 
(2009) [hereinafter Osofsky, Climate Change “International”?]; Hari M. Osofsky, 
Climate Change Litigation as Pluralist Legal Dialogue?, 26A STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 
181 (2007) [hereinafter Osofsky, Climate Change Litigation as Pluralist Legal 
Dialogue?]; Hari M. Osofsky, Local Approaches to Transnational Corporate 
Responsibility: Mapping the Role of Subnational Climate Change Litigation, 20 
PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 143 (2007) [hereinafter Osofsky, 
Local Approaches to Transnational Corporate Responsibility]; Hari M. Osofsky & 
Janet Koven Levit, The Scale of Networks?: Local Climate Change Coalitions, 8 
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Global Climate Policy: Will Cities Lead the Way?, 3 CLIMATE POL’Y 1, 11 (2003); 
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Haven School of International Law, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 393, 402–05 (2007); Judith 
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Sovereigntism, Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of Government Actors 
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2009). 
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PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 15 (2004). 
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concerns about leakage and lack of uniformity arising from initiatives 
by cities and states.36 
This Part contributes to this dialogue by considering how different 
perspectives on international law might influence the narrative of the 
international legal significance of these subnational efforts. In my 
previous work on the geography of climate change litigation, I argue 
that international legal theory could be categorized based on the 
extent to which it views the nation-state as impenetrable and 
legitimate, and that these different categories of theory would have 
variant narratives of the international legal significance of 
Massachusetts v. EPA.37 Specifically, I grouped international legal 
theory into four main categories which have salience for an 
understanding of these subnational coalitions’ efforts: strict 
Westphalian, modified Westphalian, pluralist, and critical.38 Strict 
Westphalians focus on the nation-state as the primary subject and 
object of international law and only consider nation-state behavior in 
narrating international lawmaking.39 Modified Westphalians maintain 
the centrality of the nation-state but recognize a wide range of actors 
as relevant to the international lawmaking process.40 Pluralists 
decenter the nation-state and argue that the international lawmaking 
narrative should include as meaningful a broader set of activities and 
actors.41 Critical international legal scholars question the legitimacy 
 
36. E.g., Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local 
Climate Policies, 155 U. PENN. L. REV. 1961, 1962 (2007) (claiming that 
―subnational state-level action is not the best way to combat global climate 
change‖). 
37. See Hari M Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation Part II: 
Narratives of Massachusetts v. EPA, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 573 (2008). 
38. Id. at 578–79. 
39. For an exposition of that model, see id. at 588–89; BROWNLIE, supra note 
32; Michael J. Kelly, Pulling at the Threads of Westphalia: “Involuntary 
Sovereignty Waiver”—Revolutionary International Legal Theory or Return to Rule 
by the Great Powers?, 10 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 361, 382 (2005). 
40. See Osofsky, supra note 37, at 589–90. For examples of the diverse 
conceptual approaches that arguably fall into the category of modified Westphalian 
scholarship, compare JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) with ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD 
ORDER 18–23 (2004) and Harold Hongju Koh, Jefferson Memorial Lecture: 
Transnational Legal Process After September 11th, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 337, 
339 (2004). 
41. See Osofsky, supra note 37, at 589–90. For examples of pluralist approaches 
to international law, see HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, 
JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY xxi 
(1992); Richard A. Falk, Casting the Spell: The New Haven School of International 
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of the international legal system and focus on the problematic power 
dynamics that underlie lawmaking processes.42 These four types of 
conceptual approaches would view the subnational climate change 
efforts’ international legal relevance differently; exploring each 
approach’s potential narrative of their relevance provides a tool for 
understanding the significance of these agreements better. 
Strict Westphalians would view agreements among subnational 
units as irrelevant to international law except for their contribution to 
national efforts. Their story would begin and end with the treaty 
efforts to address climate change and view side meetings among 
cities, states, and provinces as lacking international legal import. 
They would recognize that these entities represent a large percentage 
of global emissions but would view their efforts as helping nation-
states meet pledges under the Kyoto Protocol or Copenhagen Accord. 
In so doing, they would valorize the formal account with which this 
Part begins and reject intuitions that there is more to the story.43 
Modified Westphalians would retain the central focus on nation-
states participating in a treaty-making process as the primary 
international law account regarding climate change. However, they 
would consider the subnational efforts as a relevant part of the story 
of how these treaties are made. For instance, transnational legal 
process scholars might focus on the way in which subnational 
coalitions contribute to a norm internalization process that they view 
 
Law, 104 YALE L.J. 1991 (1995); Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The 
Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT’L L. 
1 (1959); Myres S. McDougal et al., The World Constitutive Process of 
Authoritative Decisions, 19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 253 (1967); W. Michael Reisman, 
International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, 75 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 
PROC. 101 (1981); Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1155 (2007); Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Law 
Making: The Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125 
(2005). 
42. See Osofsky, supra note 37, at 589 (citation omitted). For examples of 
critical international legal scholarship, see BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND 
THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE (2003); Ruth Gordon, Critical Race Theory and 
International Law: Convergence and Divergence, 45 VILL. L. REV. 827 (2000); 
David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 335, 476–500 (2000); Obiora Chinedu Okafor, Newness, 
Imperialism, and International Legal Reform in Our Time: A Twail Perspective, 43 
OSGOODE HALL L. J. 171 (2005). 
43. For a discussion of strict Westphalian conceptual approaches, see Osofsky, 
supra note 37, at 591–94; Kelly, supra note 39, at 364–94. 
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as undergirding international law; these coalitions and their 
individual members participate in processes of ―interaction, 
interpretation, and internalization‖ which help to establish 
transnational climate change norms and put pressure on nation-states 
to codify commitments in line with these norms in the treaty-making 
process.44 These accounts thus bring the subnational coalitions into 
the international lawmaking story in ways beyond their domestic 
relevance but still focus on the ultimate international law as the 
formal treaty agreement reached. 
Pluralists would view these subnational coalitions as having a 
greater role in the international lawmaking process than would 
modified Westphalians.45 For example, Myres McDougal and Harold 
Lasswell, who pioneered the New Haven School approach upon 
which many conceptions of global legal pluralism build, defined law 
as ―a process of authoritative decision by which the members of a 
community clarify and secure their common interests.‖46 The 
agreements by subnational coalitions arguably would count as 
international lawmaking under such an approach, as the governments 
participating are sovereigns making decisions together to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions which they have the power to implement in 
their local contexts. The subnational governments make authoritative 
decisions about their individual approaches to land use planning and 
transportation and articulated their common interests in these 
documents produced at the Conference. Although this articulation is 
not formally binding—the subnational governments would not suffer 
legal consequences from walking away—this process of clarifying 
and stating their common interests by the subnational governments 
would likely be adequate to form part of lawmaking in a pluralist 
account. The nation-states’ Copenhagen Accord and the subnational 
efforts thus would each be pieces of overall transnational lawmaking 
on climate change. 
Critical international legal scholars would ground their narrative of 
the significance of these subnational agreements in foundational 
concerns about the legitimacy of the international legal system and 
 
44. For an exposition of transnational legal process, see Koh, supra note 40, at 
339. 
45. For an exploration of a pluralist perspective on California as an international 
lawmaker in the context of climate change litigation, see Osofsky, Climate Change 
Litigation as Pluralist Legal Dialogue?, supra note 33, at 196–208. 
46. LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 41, at xxi. 
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the nation-state sovereignty which undergirds this. They likely would 
view the unequal distribution of emissions and impacts as grounded 
in the same inequality and post-colonial legacy that makes the 
international legal order problematic. Critical scholars would 
probably question the Copenhagen Accord, both because they view it 
as grounded in consent among unequal and often illegitimate 
sovereigns and because of its limited ability to address the problem of 
climate change even under the current legal order. They might view 
the subnational agreements as an example of why the international 
order is insufficiently inclusive or be skeptical of those agreements 
for some of the same reasons they question those of the nation-state.47  
As I note in my previous work, scholarship often does not fall 
neatly into one of these four categories but rather lies at the border 
between them or has elements of more than one category.48 For 
example, the line between many modified Westphalian accounts and 
pluralist accounts is often quite thin. Both sets of scholars would 
recognize the formal lawmaking between nation-states in the 
Copenhagen negotiations and Accord and would treat the subnational 
agreements as having some relevance to the international lawmaking 
stories. Some theories at the border are difficult to fully categorize 
because modified Westphalian’s partial decentering of the nation-
state and recognition of other actors bleed into pluralists’ fuller 
decentering and treatment of a wider range of behavior as part of 
lawmaking.49 The key distinction for purposes of this analysis, 
however one chooses to characterize any particular approach, is that 
pluralists are more likely to treat the subnational agreements as 
having independent international lawmaking relevance beyond their 
 
47. For examples of critical accounts of international law, see RAJAGOPAL, 
supra note 42; Gordon, supra note 42; Kennedy, supra note 42, at 476–500; 
Okafor, supra note 42. 
48. See Osofsky, supra note 37.  
49. For example, Anne-Marie Slaughter’s ―new world order‖ presents a view of 
global governance grounded in a three-dimensional model of transgovernmental 
relationships that form the infrastructure of global governance. SLAUGHTER, supra 
note 40, at 19–23. Slaughter’s approach treats the state as one actor among many 
but as the most important of those many actors. Id. at 18–19. Her theory thus has 
elements of a modified Westphalian approach and elements of a pluralist one. I 
have categorized her theory as more of a modified Westphalian one because of her 
exposition of state centrality, but one could argue this point the other way based on 
her recognition of the critical roles of a wide range of actors. Osofsky, supra note 
37, at 590. 
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contribution to national efforts.50  
These nuances, which reveal international legal theory as existing 
along a spectrum of ideas in a complex fashion, do not undermine 
this Part’s central point. Whether a critical approach has pluralist 
elements or a modified Westphalian account decenters the nation-
state significantly, these theoretical categories represent different 
ways of understanding international lawmaking which result in 
varying narratives of the significance of subnational climate 
agreements. These divergent stories raise both conceptual and 
practical issues with which Part IV grapples. Namely, how should 
these different views about the international legal significance of 
cities, states, and provinces from around the world collaborating on 
climate change influence how formal international lawmaking might 
incorporate them?  
IV. OPPORTUNITIES FOR GREATER INTEGRATION OF THE 
SUBNATIONAL INTO INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 
The four narratives articulated in Part III represent very different 
ways of addressing the tension between the formal exclusion of and 
the significant informal activity by subnational governments at 
Copenhagen. These narratives likely would translate into varying 
perspectives on whether and how subnational efforts should be 
further integrated into the treaty-making process in the future. This 
Part lays out these different options through the lenses of the four 
approaches to framing international law and then explores 
possibilities for resolving their conflicting narratives. 
The strict Westphalians would probably oppose any sort of formal 
integration of subnational entities into the treaty process, as such a 
modification would violate their sense of nation-states as the primary 
subjects and objects of international law. As noted in Part III, they 
regard cities, states, and provinces as important mainly for their 
contribution to the nation-state’s internal decisionmaking and 
compliance. Given that, they would probably regard as appropriate 
the current state of affairs in which subnational governments have an 
extensive formal domestic role but a more limited international one. 
For example, they would view U.S. localities and states as 
appropriately participating in a U.S. legal process grounded in its 
federalist system of government and these entities’ participation in 
 
50. Osofsky, supra note 37, at 590–91. 
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transnational coalitions as an informal process that should be treated 
as separate from the real international lawmaking. Strict 
Westphalians would likely vary in the extent to which they view the 
coalitions as a benign development or as potentially disruptive to the 
main event of nation-state negotiations. But whether or not they have 
concerns about all of this subnational activity, they would agree that 
international law does and should rest upon formal agreements 
among nation-states and that dynamics among other actors should be 
treated separately.51 
Modified Westphalians would generally be more open to reform of 
the international legal decisionmaking processes than would strict 
Westphalians. Although they would regard the decisions among 
nation-states as the critical international lawmaking moment, their 
acceptance of the ways in which a wide range of actors contribute to 
that lawmaking process might make them more disposed to a system 
in which the formal role of subnational actors is increased. In 
particular, modified Westphalians would likely be particularly drawn 
to reforms in which these actors are given a greater participatory role 
in the predecision period.52 Such reforms might include, for example, 
creating forums in which the subnational coalitions could meet 
directly with the nation-states involved in negotiations or putting 
provisions into formal agreements that acknowledge the subnational 
role in climate change regulation. These reforms would not give 
subnational governments a true seat at the table in negotiations 
among nation-states, as they would likely be treated as one 
stakeholder among many and they would not be part of the ultimate 
decisionmaking moment, but they would ensure a greater 
interconnection than took place at Copenhagen.  
Pluralists probably would be more open to changing the ultimate 
decisionmaking moment than would modified Westphalians. While 
pluralists might be drawn to the above-described reforms as 
acknowledging the many actors involved formally and informally in 
international lawmaking better than the current process, their 
decentering of the nation-state means that they view the moment at 
which countries bind themselves based on sovereign and equal 
 
51. For a discussion of strict Westphalian conceptual approaches, see Osofsky, 
supra note 37, at 591–94; Kelly, supra note 39, at 364–94. 
52. For a discussion of modified Westphalian conceptual approaches, see 
Osofsky, supra note 37, at 594–97; SLAUGHTER, supra note 40; Koh supra note 40; 
GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 40. 
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consent to be less sacrosanct than do either strict or modified 
Wesphalians. As a result, some pluralists might be interested in 
exploring more significant reform in which nonnation-state actors 
might be allowed to participate formally in international agreements 
on climate change.53 Such agreements with substate and potentially 
even nonstate key stakeholders, such as corporations and 
nongovernmental organizations, might supplement or supplant the 
treaties currently being crafted under the auspices of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.54 The crafting of 
these agreements would raise complex logistical and equity issues, 
and pluralists might disagree on the most appropriate way to identify 
and incorporate key stakeholders. Whatever their nuances, though, 
these agreements likely would be structured to create cross-cutting 
mitigation and adaptation strategies which would include a mix of 
binding and voluntary commitments for the many types of entities 
involved. 
Finally, critical scholars might view the above-mentioned reforms 
as an improvement upon the status quo but would still question the 
fundamental structure of the international legal system. They likely 
would want this greater inclusion of key stakeholders to be part of a 
broader deconstruction and reconstruction of the entire international 
legal system to create a more just and equitable structure of law. 
Their concern would be that these sorts of reforms, whether the more 
incremental ones described under the modified Westphalian approach 
or the more radical ones described under the pluralist approach, 
would not change the system sufficiently to address its basic 
illegitimacy. Many of them would regard rethinking of 
decisionmaking structures within the current system as fundamentally 
limited by the problems of equity and legitimacy that plague the 
system as a whole. Critical legal scholars thus would want a major 
overhaul of the international legal system with these questions 
addressed in the process of reconstitution.55 
 
53. For a discussion of modified Westphalian conceptual approaches, see 
Osofsky, Climate Change Litigation as Pluralist Legal Dialogue?, supra note 22, 
at 588–89; Kelly, supra note 32; BROWNLIE, supra note 33; Osofsky, supra note 
39. 
54. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 
1992, S. TREATY DOC NO. 102–38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/English/notpubl/unfccc_eng.pdf. 
55. For examples of critical accounts of international law, see RAJAGOPAL, 
supra note 42; Gordon, supra note 26; Kennedy, supra note 42; Okafor, supra note 
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These differences among potential models raise a fundamental 
concern about how greater integration of subnational actors might 
proceed as a practical matter. The models’ basic views of 
international law vary so greatly that a synthesis which includes all of 
them would be extremely difficult. Those crafting the next generation 
of international lawmaking on climate change cannot simultaneously 
leave processes as they are, create predecisional inclusion only, 
change the decisionmaking process on this issue, and reconstitute the 
international legal system. To move forward, then, two main options 
exist. First, the key decisionmakers could choose one of the four 
options as superior and then work to operationalize it. Second, they 
could try to acknowledge the validity embodied in each model and 
try to move forward in a way that accepts each of them. 
The first option is quite straightforward and comports well with 
how policymaking often proceeds. If decisionmakers view these 
different narratives as alternate paths forward, they can simply 
choose a path and engage the practical complexities that follow. They 
thus might look at how subnational entities might be included more 
fully at the next COP under the modified Westphalian model or 
instead consider what COP alternative they might create in line with 
the pluralist model. In taking the first option, then, decisonmakers are 
accepting a particular vision of international law and exploring its 
consequences. 
The second option is harder to envision. I began to explore what 
such an approach might look like in the Massachusetts v. EPA 
context by drawing from Edward Soja’s notion of ―thirdspace.‖56 Soja 
envisions thirdspace as one in which we can view places from every 
angle and also respect what is unseen and cannot be understood.57 He 
further introduces the idea of ―thirding‖ as an approach that moves 
beyond dialectical synthesis of thesis-antithesis-synthesis to introduce 
an ―other than‖ option which disorders, deconstructs, and tentatively 
reconstitutes the many existing options to create something that is 
―both similar and strikingly different.‖58  
 
42. 
56. Osofsky, supra note 37, at 604–19. See generally EDWARD W. SOJA, 
THIRDSPACE: JOURNEYS TO LOS ANGELES AND OTHER REAL-AND-IMAGINED 
PLACES (1996). 
57. Id. at 56 
58. Id. at 60–61. 
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An application of Soja’s approach to the four options posed above 
would require a simultaneous acceptance of each of their truths 
despite the conflicts among them and then a moving forward based 
on such an acceptance. In practical terms, that might mean exploring 
those four options in depth and creating possible approaches to 
operationalizing each of them. However, rather than taking these four 
options as alternate paths, the way forward might draw from more 
than one of them, not to create a neat synthesis of approaches but 
rather to create a new approach that embraces these conflicting 
narratives. For example, maybe key decisionmakers should leave the 
COP process as it is but also create an alternative process to it. Or 
maybe they should reform the COP process and create an alternative 
process to it. ―Thirding‖ essentially presents an option in which 
decisonmakers do not have to focus on resolving the conflict among 
the four narratives but can learn from each of them by embracing 
their differences. 
To some extent, the ambiguities at the boundaries of these 
narratives and of how to categorize scholarship already create 
potential Thirdspace. These complexities reinforce the difficulty and 
potential inappropriateness of trying to balkanize these approaches as 
distinct options. But major differences still exist among these four 
main approaches to conceptualizing the role of subnational actors and 
their agreements. Constructing a workable Thirdspace approach 
would require somehow allowing meaningful divergence to remain, 
which is often a difficult task in practical policymaking. 
Whether policymakers and scholars decide to move forward by 
choosing a conceptual approach to international law and exploring its 
practical implications or by continuing to explore the benefits and 
limitations of the paths that each conceptual approach might provide, 
these narratives help to reframe the discourse about and possibilities 
for subnational participation in transnational climate governance. 
This rethinking is critical as the traditional international law 
processes struggle to address the problem of climate change 
adequately, and subnational entities continue to collaborate 
transnationally outside of formal lawmaking processes. Whether or 
not key decisionmakers ultimately return to the current approach to 
addressing subnational participation—which treats these coalitions’ 
agreements as irrelevant to the formal international law story—as the 
best one, the urgency of the problem demands creative 
conceptualization followed by a translation of those ideas into 
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practical options.  
V. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS ON THE ROLE OF THE SUBNATIONAL 
IN MULTILATERALISM AND GLOBAL LAW  
This Paper’s reflections on the role of transnational agreements 
among subnational actors at Copenhagen form part of this project of 
rethinking and, in the process, raise broader issues for the concepts of 
―multilateralism‖ and ―global law‖ that are the focus of this volume. 
Specifically, these parallel activities among actors not traditionally 
treated as international lawmakers push the boundaries of 
conventional notions of what both terms mean. Multilateralism and 
global law typically would involve relations among multiple nation-
states. Climate change governance certainly involves those traditional 
relationships, but it also includes smaller-scale actors behaving 
transnationally. Whether or not one accepts a narrative in which those 
smaller-scale actors should be integrated more into formal 
international legal efforts, these subnational agreements at least 
potentially represent a broader notion of the actors involved in 
multilateralism and a more multiscalar notion of global law. 
These issues open further research questions about how to 
operationalize these theories regarding a more inclusive international 
legal order which I plan to address in future work. Namely, if formal 
international legal processes to address climate change choose to 
incorporate these subnational agreements more directly, what would 
be the best mechanisms for doing so? Can subnational actors play a 
constructive role in negotiations which are currently so mired in 
complex dynamics among a large number of nation-state actors that 
some key national governments are meeting in other, smaller 
international venues? If these additional actors can and should be 
brought in, what should be their substantive and procedural role? To 
what extent should we adjust our notions of formal international law 
to include them and to what extent would their informal integration 
be more effective? These questions lack easy answers but are critical 
to any version of more effective, multiscalar transnational approaches 
to climate change. I plan to try to answer them in future scholarship 
through examining more inclusive international treaty-making 
models in other substantive contexts and considering to what extent 
they are effective and could be translated into the climate change 
governance. Such models, if able to be implemented in a 
constructive, practical fashion, represent expanded understandings of 
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both multilateralism and global governance which may allow the 
international legal community to address complex multipolar, 
multiscalar problems like climate change more accurately and 
effectively.  
 
